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COMMENT
TORTS - APORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES - INDIVISIBLE INJURIES -
Bruckman v. Pena, 487 P.2d 566 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
ON July 21, 1964, William Pena, the plaintiff, suffered exten-
sive injuries in an automobile accident with defendants.
Some 11 months later, plaintiff was involved in a second
accident with resultant aggravation of the injuries sustained
in the first. The parties involved in the later accident settled
the plaintiff's claim against them in return for a covenant not
to sue and were therefore not joined in the instant action. In
the trial below, a medical expert testified that the plaintiff had
suffered permanent brain damage in each of the accidents, but
that it was impossible to apportion the injury between the two
accidents. The trial judge instructed the jury that if the evi-
dence did not support an apportionment of damages between
the two injuries the defendants would be liable for the entire
amount of damages.' A verdict of $58,0632 was returned in
favor of the plaintiff and judgment was entered thereon. On
appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals, held, reversed. The
defendants cannot be held liable for the plaintiff's subsequent
injury whether or not such damage can be apportioned between
the two injuries. Heretofore, the question of whether the first
of several tortfeasors can be held jointly liable for an in-
divisible injury had not been litigated.
Central to an appreciation of the instant case and its impli-
cations for Colorado tort law is an understanding of the rule
previously laid down in Newbury v. Vogel.:3 The court there
1 Instruction No. 15:
If you find that after the collision complained of Plaintiff, William
Pena, had an injury which aggravated the ailment or disability
received in the collision complained of, the Plaintiff is entitled to
recover fcr the injury or pain received in the collision complained
of; but he is not entitled to recover for any physical ailment or
disability which he may have incurred subsequent to the collision.
Where a subsequent injury occurs which aggravated the condition
caused by the collision, it is your duty, if possible, to appcrtion
the amount of disability and pain between that caused by the subse-
quent injury and that caused by the collision. But if you find that
the evidence does not permit such an apportionment, then the De-
fendants are liable for the entire disability. (emphasis added).
2 It is at least of passing interest to note that the tortfeasor involved in
the later accident settled out of court with the plaintiff for a sum of
$9,500.00. The wide latitude between the two figures is not indicative
of the relative merits of the two causes. But, if the jury found that
they could not apportion the injury between the two accidents and
therefore made their award for the entire disability (according to In-
struction No. 15), the $9,500.00 figure represents a double recovery.
3 151 Colo. 520, 379 P.2d 811 (1963).
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held that where a pre-existing diseased condition is aggravated
by trauma caused by the negligence of the defendant, and no
apportionment of the disability between that caused by the pre-
existing condition and that caused by the trauma can be made,
the defendant is responsible for the entire damage. This is true
notwithstanding the fact that a portion of the present and future
disability is obviously attributable to the pre-existing condition.
In Hylton v. Wade4 this rule was extended to cases where the
pre-existing condition was of traumatic origin. Therefore, in a
case where damages are proximately the result of more than
one causitive agent (including a pre-existing condition), and
there is no evidence to support an apportionment between such
causes, the plaintiff can recover his entire damage from the
tortfeasor who aggravates the pre-existing condition.
Inherent in the principle enunciated in Newberry is the
requirement that once the plaintiff makes his case, it is incum-
bent upon the defendant to prove apportionability in order to
limit his liability. This position has been adopted by the Re-
statement 5 and has received judicial expression in the case of
Summers v. Tice,G where the court, in resolving a similar
dilemma, said that for "reasons of policy and justice," so that
"the innocent wronged party [is] not deprived of his right to
redress," the burden should be upon the defendant to absolve
himself of liability.
The rule in Newbury can be rationalized in several ways.
It is said that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him,
and if his wrong aggravates an existing disability, and appor-
tionment is not possible, then he should be liable for the entire
damage. 7 Another rationale is that when a latent condition
itself does not cause pain or disability, then the injury, and not
the dormant condition, is the proximate cause of the pain and
disability. s In yet another approach, the court in Sutterfield v.
District Court,"' in explaining Newbury, seemingly elevated Rule
20 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure (on permissive
4 29 Colo. App. 98, 478 P.2d 690 (1970).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965).
" 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91 (1948).
7 Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955); citing,
Harris v. Los Angeles Transit Co., 111 Cal. App. 2d 593, 245 P.2d 35
(1952).
8 Owen v. Dix, 210 Ark. 562, 196 S.W.2d 913 (1946); Conner v. City of
Nevada, 188 Mo. 133, 86 S.W. 256 (1905); Bennett v. Messick, 76 Wash.
2d 474, 457 P.2d 609 (1969).
9 165 Colo. 225, 438 P.2d 236 (1968).
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joinder)10 to the status of substantive law when it stated:
"[W] e point out that the claims for relief asserted here arise
out of a single injury which resulted from the two accidents.
Thus it is the injury which is the 'occurrence' giving rise to the
claim for relief."'" Finally, the Newbury rule may be explained
as a statement of judicial policy.' 2 Thus the court in Holtz v.
Holder13 asserted rather candidly:
[Ilt is more desirable, as a matter of policy, for an injured and
innocent plaintiff to recover his entire damages jointly and sev-
erally from independent tortfeasors, one of whom may have to
pay more than his just share, than it is to let two or more wrong-
doers escape liability altogether, simply because the plaintiff
cannot carry the impossible burden of proving the respective
shares of causation or because the tortfeasors have not committed
a joint tort.1
4
In addition to Newbury, also noteworthy is the line of cases
arising out of the so-called chain reaction type automobile
accident. In Maddux v. Donaldson"5 the two successive tort-
feasors were held jointly liable for damages arising from an
indivisible injury caused by collisions 30 seconds apart. The
court said that the fact that one wrong occurs a few seconds
after the other is without legal significance. What is significant
is that the injury is indivisible.'6 In Ruud v. Grimm, 7 where
the first accident occurred in the morning and the second oc-
curred in the afternoon of the same day, the court, citing
Maddux, stated that "where two or more persons acting in-
dependently are guilty of consecutive acts of negligence closely
related in point of time, and cause damage to another under
circumstances where the damage is indivisible . . . the negligent
actors are jointly and severally liable.""' Lip service to the time
10 COLO. R. Crv. P. 20 (a). Permissive Joinder. "All persons may be joined
in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants
will arise in the action." (emphasis added).
11 438 P.2d at 239. This reasoning was specifically rejected in Ryan v.
Mackolin, 14 Ohio St. 2d 213, 220, 237 N.E.2d 377, 382 (1968) where
the court said "their permissive joinder in one action . . . does not
ipso facto entitle the plaintiff to a joint judgment against them for the
entire damages incurred following the second collision." Accord, Fitz-
williams v. O'Shaughnessy, 40 Wis. 2d 123, 161 N.W.2d 244 (1968);
Caygill v. Ipsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
12 L. GREN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 142 (1927).
13 101 Ariz. 247, 418 P.2d 584 (1966).
14 Id. at 251, 418 P.2d at 588; accord, Copley v. Putter, 93 Cal. App. 2d 453,
207 P.2d 876 (1949).
15 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33, 100 A.L.R.2d 1 (1961).
16 Accord, Watts v. Smith, 375 Mich. 120, 134 N.W.2d 194 (1965); see also,
Gulf, C.&S.F. Ry. Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 273 F. 946 (D. Del. 1921).
17 252 Iowa 1266, 1272, 110 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1961).
18id. (emphasis added).
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element was abandoned in Treanor v. B.P.E. Leasing.19 where,
in fixing liability for accidents occurring 2 months apart, the
court held that the rule of joint liability for indivisible injuries
should not be confined to accidents that occur almost simul-
taneously. The court stated that the phrase "closely related in
point of time" in Ruud had been given undue emphasis. In
effect, the court held that to find consecutive tortfeasors jointly
liable for an indivisible injury the plaintiff must go no further
than to prove proximate cause. 0
Further discussion of the rule of joint liability for indi-
visible injuries caused by consecutive tortfeasors is not within
the scope of this comment. Suffice it to say that in the majority
of jurisdictions, joint tortfeasors who have contributed to an
injury not susceptible to apportionment would be held jointly
liable under one of the foregoing theories. Moreover, in Colo-
rado, with the rule in Newbury and Hylton, the subsequent
tortfeasor would be held liable for the entire damage if no
apportionment could be made.
As previously noted, Bruckman was decided as a case of
first impression on the question of whether an injured plaintiff
will be allowed to recover his entire damage from the first of
several tortfeasors, each of whom was the proximate cause of
an indeterminate amount of that damage. The reverse factual
situation was found in Newbury and Hylton; and in cases like
Maddux, Ruud and Treanor it seemed not to matter which of
a series of tortfeasors was at bar.
The Bruckman court reasoned that the general rule is that
one injured by the negligence of another is entitled to recover
the damages proximately caused by that negligence, and that
the burden of proving such damages is upon the plaintiff. Ac-
cordingly, the court found error in the trial judge's instruc-
tion permitting the plaintiff to recover damages against the
defendants for injuries which the plaintiff received subsequent
to any act of negligence on the part of the defendants and from
causes for which the defendants were in no way responsible.
21
1q 158 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa 1968). Contra, Close v. Matson, 102 Ga. App. 669,
117 S.E.2d 251 (1960); Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 220 P. 782 (1923).
2-1158 N.W.2d at 6.
21 The first hint that the court would refuse to apply Newbury came at
oral argument when one of the judges asked when a defendant's vul-
nerability would end if the defendant remained liable for subsequent
aggravation. Of course, the answer to that question, if Newbury is
applied, is that payment and release, res judicata, or expiration of the
6-year statute of limitation would terminate the defendant's liability for
such subsequent injury. The first tortfeasor would become, in effect,
an insurer of the plaintiff's condition until one of the above occurred.
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Further, the court found the instruction to be infirm because
it placed upon the defendants the burden of proving that the
plaintiff's injury could be apportioned between the two acci-
dents in order to limit their liability.
Apparently, the court was not impressed by the plaintiff's
"impossible burden of proving" 22 the amount of damage attrib-
utable to each of several causes. Neither have been a number
of other authorities. McCormick states that:
When the entire disability sustained by the plaintiff is contrib-
uted to both by the injury for which the defendant is responsi-
ble and from other causes, such as disease, weakened condition
from the use of alcohol, or the like, then the evidence must make
clear how much of the disability proceeds from the former source
in order for the plaintiff to recover at all, and the jury should
be instructed to give damages only for that part of the resulting
disability.
23
Cooley takes a similar view. He states that "[a] tort which
is several when committed cannot be made joint by matters
occurring subsequently, over which the tortfeasor has no con-
trol. '24 Furthermore, because a plaintiff cannot prove the wrong
done by one person this is no reason for him to recover his
damages from another who did not cause them.23
The court's adoption of the strict technical view in Bruck-
man has resulted in the unlovely spectacle of a plaintiff turned
away without redress even though he has shown the aggregate
amount of the damages that he has suffered at the hands of
several tortfeasors.2 1, It is submitted that the more modern
view is in line with the rule set out in Newbury. The Restate-
ment provides that "[w]here two or more causes combine
to produce such a single result, incapable of division on any
logical or reasonable basis, and each is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm, the courts have refused to make an
arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each of the causes
is charged with responsibility for the entire harm. 2 7 Prosser
2 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1128 (1956).
23 C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 273 (1935).
24 1 R. COOLEY, TORTS 284 (1932).
25 Id. at 285.
26 It should be noted that in the recent case of Alexander v. White, which
involved the same facts as Bruckman, the court softened the sting of
Bruckman somewhat by stating:
On the whole, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support
a finding of some damages occurring strictly as a result of the first
accident. Plaintiff presented evidence that he suffered pain and
underwent medical treatment for the injuries caused by the first
accident. The cost of this treatment and related expenses could
then be strictly apportioned to this accident, and therefore he would
be entitled to recover at least these damages.
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A, comment on subsection (2) at
440 (1965).
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agrees. He states that "[w] here no such basis can be found,
and any division must be purely arbitrary, there is no practical
course except to hold the defendant for the entire loss, not-
withstanding the fact that other causes have contributed to it.'
'2s
This is not to say that this theory is of very recent origin. Wig-
more essentially stated this principle in 1922.
21
Practically speaking, Bruckman, operating with Newbury,
will produce some startling results. Assuming facts similar to
those in the instant case, consider what would happen if, instead
of the first, the second tortfeasor were sued. In proving dam-
ages, the plaintiff would have only to show the aggregate
amount of his damages from both accidents and that those dam-
ages could not be apportioned between the two accidents. 30 He
would then be entitled to the Newbury instruction,31 and would
recover his entire damages. 32 In other words, the mere substitu-
tion of the second tortfeasor for the first, would have compelled
a different result in Bruckman. Even more startling, if both
tortfeasors were named as co-defendants, the parties would be
entitled to instructions on the law of both Bruckman and New-
bury with the result that the first tortfeasor would escape
liability completely while the second would be liable for the
entire amount.
33
Fortunately, there exists a viable alternative to these incon-
sistent principles, and the inequitable results they tend to pro-
duce. In Loui v. Oakley,34 the Supreme Court of Hawaii, when
confronted with facts similar to those faced by the Colorado
court in Bruckman, held that where the jury cannot determine
by a preponderance of the evidence the extent to which the
28 W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 314 (4th ed. 1971).
2
9Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severence of Damages; Making the
Innocent Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REV. 458 (1922).
30 McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593, 594 (10th Cir. 1966).
31 COLO. JURY INST. § 6:8.
If you find that before the accident plaintiff, (name), had a physi-
cal ailment or disability, and because of the accident this ailment or
disability was aggravated, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for
any disability or pain caused by such aggravation; but he is not
entitled to recover for any physical ailment or disability which
may have existed prior to the accident, or for any ailments or dis-
abilities from which plaintiff may now be suffering which were
not caused or contributed to by the accident.
Where a pre-existing condition exists which has been aggravated
by the accident it is your duty, if possible, to apportion the
amount of disability and pain between that caused by the pre-
existing condition and that caused by the accident. But if you
find that the evidence does not permit such an apportionment,
then the defendant is liable for the entire disability.
32 Alexander v. White, 488 P.2d 1120 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
88 Id.
34 50 Hawaii 260, 438 P.2d 393 (1968).
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damages are due to the defendant's negligence, then it may
make a rough apportionment; and if it is incapable of even
making a rough apportionment, it must apportion the damages
equally among the various causes.3 5 In apportioning the dam-
ages under this rule, each accident is considered, regardless of
the possibility that the plaintiff may not be able to recover the
damages attributable to a given cause.3 6
In adopting the foregoing rule, the Hawaiian court was con-
cerned primarily with steering "a careful course between the
Scylla of denying the plaintiff any remedy and the Charybdis
of imposing on one defendant all the damages, at least some of
which would not have occurred without the independent acts of
other persons. '3 7 The court accomplished its objective by re-
jecting the rule adopted in Bruckman and by limiting the
Hawaiian version of the Newbury rule38 to the situation where
a latent pre-existing condition is aggravated by the defendant's
negligence.
The approach of the Hawaiian court in Loui finds support,
albeit by analogy, in the well-settled principle that "where the
cause and existence of damages has been established with
requisite certainty, recovery will not be denied because such
damages are difficult of ascertainment. '39 The obvious rationale
for this rule is that a plaintiff who has met his burden of prov-
ing damages and has established the requisite proximate cause
should not be denied redress. This same rationale is equally
applicable to the situation involving damages which cannot be
accurately apportioned among several different causative agents.
Clearly, in such a situation the plaintiff should not be denied
recovery altogether. This is not to say, however, that he should
be entitled to recover his entire damages from a single defend-
ant where some undefined portion of such damages is attrib-
utable to other causes. Hence the Hawaiian court's arbitrary
apportionment rule.
Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that the court in
Bruckman should have taken the approach adopted by the
Hawaiian court in Loui. The Loui rule, correctly applied, would
have the effect of limiting the application of Newbury to cases
involving the aggravation of a pre-existing latent condition.4"
35 Id. at 264-65, 438 P.2d at 397.
36 Id.
371d.
38 Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Hawaii 42, 410 P.2d 976 (1966).
39 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 102.
40 Bachran v. Morishige, 469 P.2d 808 (Hawaii 1971); Matsumoto v. Kaku,
484 P.2d 147, 151 (Hawaii 1971) (dissenting opinion).
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In all other instances, the damages would be apportioned among
the various causes, either strictly or arbitrarily.4 1 That this
approach is more equitable and doctrinally consistent than that
taken by the Bruckrnan court is obvious. It can only be hoped
that the Colorado Court of Appeals will recognize this and take
steps to replace the Bruckman rule with the approach taken in
Loui. Such a change is one of the "felt necessities of the time,
'
42
and should not be postponed beyond the next opportunity to
effect it.
John F. Head
41 Cases cited note 39 supra.
420. HOLMES. THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
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